The Pentagon’s Golden Dome is the most ambitious next-generation missile defense architecture in the U.S., integrating sensors, communications and interceptors across space, air, sea and ground for unified, real-time missile threat response.
To examine the Golden Dome’s implications for U.S. defense infrastructure, we interviewed Josh Foerschler, senior business development manager for aerospace, space and defense at Burns & McDonnell, and Kirk Molacek, senior project manager at Burns & McDonnell who has extensive experience delivering Department of Defense programs. They share insights on current trends, anticipated program development and ways engineering and construction partners can deliver value.
When it comes to emerging threats, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) characterizes foreign missile threats, while the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) develops and integrates the nation’s missile defense capabilities.
Q: What is the Golden Dome, and how does it differ from previous U.S. missile defense initiatives?
Josh Foerschler: Golden Dome is an objective to scale beyond regional systems into a global, layered defense system. The model often referenced is Israel’s Iron Dome, which integrates radars, conflict management and interceptors, but the U.S. challenge is many times larger. The federal government outlined a notional five-layer architecture that spans satellite-based sensing and communications down to city-level minidomes with local sensors and ready interceptors.
Unlike past programs that established discrete capabilities, Golden Dome is an integration-first vision that connects sea-based systems such as Aegis, ground batteries, space assets and command networks into something that can see, decide and act at continental scale.
Kirk Molacek: The real differentiator is the requirement for interoperability among these systems with multiple military services and the intelligence community that will exchange validated data in near-real time. That is a greater leap than any single new sensor or interceptor.
Q: What specific threats will it be designed to counter?
JF: The honest answer is that it is still being defined by potential threats. The DIA’s job is to characterize adversary capability and intent, while the MDA then shapes the architecture to counter it. The target set likely spans ballistic and cruise missiles, with growing attention on hypersonic missiles and space-enabled kill chains, meaning coordinated tracking and targeting systems.
No single system can counter every threat. Expect emphasis on more and smarter sensors, better protection of fast-maneuvering targets, and sufficient interceptor depth to handle salvos, while resisting jamming and deception efforts.
KM: That is why AI-assisted data correlation and verification will matter. There is growing momentum to incorporate AI-driven capabilities that can accelerate analysis and improve threat validation. These tools fuse multisource data to distinguish real threats from noise and assign the right shooter at the right time.
Q: What are the primary engineering and integration challenges in building a nationwide, layered defense system that combines ground-based, naval and space assets?
JF: Start with system-of-systems integration. You are linking legacy and new-build capabilities across the Army, Navy, Air Force, Space Force and partners such as the National Reconnaissance Office and U.S. Space Command. The challenge is horizontal, meaning cross-domain data exchange, and vertical, meaning sensor-to-shooter timelines.
The scale requires hardened command-and-control nodes, resilient data centers and expansive ICD 705-compliant SCIFs (secure compartmented information facility) for rapid, secure intelligence processing.
KM: Add cyber resilience and electromagnetic protection. Facilities must be designed for durability, including power redundancy, EMP (electromagnetic pulse) and high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) hardening and secure backhaul. Because a single centralized command center would represent a potential point of failure, the solution will involve distributed, synchronized nodes built on common standards and automatic failover capabilities. The integration will not be solved by facilities alone, but mission-ready infrastructure is a prerequisite.
Q: What infrastructure, manufacturing capacity, testing facilities and deployment strategies are required to support the program’s success?
JF: It is a comprehensive approach. Expect new or expanded satellite manufacturing lines, sensor and interceptor production, microelectronics laboratories, and environmental and ground test capabilities, along with range modernization for flight testing.
Many pieces already exist, but Golden Dome implies scale and synchronization focusing on factories capable of rapid production, ground remote stations for continuous tracking, defense installations located near urban centers where appropriate, and secure fusion centers to close the loop from detection to decision.
KM: Do not overlook recapitalization of what is already in place. Pacific and continental U.S. sites need utility upgrades, resilient on-site power, expanded network capacity and SCIF expansions to consolidate data that is currently fragmented across locations.
We also expect growth in hypersonic test infrastructure, hardware-in-the-loop laboratories, and Tier III or better data centers to support modeling, simulation and AI-assisted analysis. Deployment will likely occur in phases that first strengthen current nodes then extend coverage to critical areas, followed by continual adaptation to new threats and technological advances.
Q: What opportunities could a program like the Golden Dome create for the engineering and construction industry?
KM: The opportunities are massive and diverse. Beyond new site delivery, there is a long runway of modernizations including power and cooling for command and control, network and cyber infrastructure, electromagnetic pulse shielding, and hardened mission critical facilities for operators, analysts and test teams.
Every layer creates downstream work, including radar sites, interceptor fields, integration laboratories, space-ground gateways, and training and simulation venues.
JF: The integration push also favors partners who recognize the connection between mission equipment and facility design, prioritizing alignment between intelligent systems and the physical components they support. Teams with experience delivering for the MDA and supporting the DIA’s threat analysis mission are well positioned to translate evolving program needs into buildable, resilient, schedule-feasible solutions.
