The origins of some of our current regulations and standards governing the manufacture and handling of energetics materials and munitions date back to 18th Century England, when black powder manufacturing was starting to scale up.
Whether it was specifying the volume of charcoal that could be kept on hand, or keeping the entire facility away from population centers, 18th century authorities were clearly beginning to recognize that volatile materials posed public safety risks, and that some form of government oversight was needed.
Considerations on quantities of gunpowder that could be stored and protocols for processing were addressed by laws passed by Parliament. The rules were detailed and quite specific, such as banning most production methods using pestle mills for grinding and processing the compounds for gunpowder. Other issues like charcoal storage separation distances also were specified.
In the U. S., the first federal regulations governing the use and transport of explosives were passed in 1866 following a devastating nitroglycerin explosion in San Francisco. The incident occurred at a Wells Fargo office when an unmarked crate containing nitroglycerin exploded, causing many fatalities and untold damage to surrounding buildings. Like many safety regulations of today, this regulation was passed as a direct result of a recognition that increasingly dangerous materials were posing a direct threat to public safety.
Though the lethality of explosives has grown many fold since the 19th Century, there is still a deeply rooted recognition that the risks of human exposure to these highly volatile energetics compounds must be addressed through comprehensive safety regulations and standards.
Steps to Mitigate Heightened Risk
With many of today’s advances in energetics technology — the result of research and development to meet evolving demands by the military —it stands to reason that the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is directly involved in setting and enforcing today’s safety protocols.
The DOD sets prescriptive standards for quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) — also called process hazard analyses (PHAs) on some sites. Nothing can advance until risks are identified and protective measures are selected and evaluated for effectiveness. Detailed hazard assessments and blast modeling are essential in gaining critical insights needed for design decisions.
After risk assessments, site selection and approvals for that site come next. The optimal site layout will balance operational needs with safety, and this is often achieved through one of three approaches:
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Avoidance: Using quantity distance (QD) arcs to separate hazardous areas.
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Prescriptive design: Relying on preapproved designs.
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Custom protective construction: Creating tailored designs based on detailed analysis.
Each approach requires rigorous documentation and coordination with the DOD’s Procurement Contracting Officer (PCO) to maintain compliance.
Risk Is Always a Factor
Recent incidents at U.S. facilities that manufacture, process or store energetics materials illustrate that human involvement in any process can undermine even the most thorough safety procedures.
On October 10, 2025, a devastating explosion at a processing plant for military-grade explosives in a rural area of central Tennessee leveled the structure and killed all 16 people present at the time. The explosion was felt for miles around and was so powerful that investigators were continuing to search for clues as to a cause for many weeks afterward.
Earlier in 2025, another explosion at a defense manufacturing plant in northern Utah destroyed a building that was used to produce an ingredient needed for solid rocket motor propellant. Though the incident caused significant damage, no one was injured at the remote facility, and according to a statement by authorities following the blast, the lack of fatalities was due to strict safety protocols that were being followed.
These incidents illustrate that even with diligence in following tight safety protocols, risk factors are still present.
Beyond Code Compliance
Even when all the boxes have been checked and the facility is 100% compliant with applicable codes, there are always opportunities to apply more stringent standards that go beyond PSM (process safety management) minimums. Multiple layers of protection analysis should be conducted by qualified professionals to identify unique operational situations that may pose undue risks.
For example, it might be recommended to keep only a fraction of the volume of materials scheduled to be produced during a full shift on-site at any time; this may result in some operational inefficiencies, but could be well worth it to gain additional safety margins. Other possibilities include installing conductive anti-static flooring for the entire plant, instead of discrete mats at workstations where workers might be handling explosive powders.
Yet a third example would be installing I-beams instead of tubular steel for plant structures. This is another step that could be taken during design to eliminate the possibility of minute amounts of explosive materials drifting into tiny holes within tubing void areas.
Another operational step to address other risks might involve configuring material handling to eliminate double picks or transfers when munitions or other types of volatile materials are transported, loaded or unloaded. Instead of a forklift unloading a pallet of materials and then placing it on a cart to be wheeled to a workstation, a crane could be used to pick the materials from a flatbed truck and then move it directly to the workstation. Eliminating as many transfers and handling steps as possible helps to mitigate risks.
Pressure to Produce
Geopolitical conflicts and other tensions are ramping up demands for munitions not seen since the early 1980s Cold War period. Those supplies that had been built up have been steadily drained due to regional conflict interventions and peacetime training.
With DOD demand increasing sharply, large manufacturers are rapidly scaling up operations and investing in capital expansions at a variety of plants.
This is no time to let down our guard. Pressure to increase production under shorter schedules will only increase in the near term. We must remain diligent in our pursuit of safety, blending schedule and cost priorities with risk assessments to achieve a product that is on time, on budget, and has thoroughly accounted for the well-being of our people.
